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principles of justice as set out by Chief Justice Nichols, supra,
inasmuch as no appeal was allowed in those cases in which a right
to a jury trial was had below.
Ohio General Code Section 12224, long since laid to rest after
having been declared unconstitutional in Wagner v. Armstrong
may well serve as a pattern for future legislation establishing
the appellate jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeals. Today, after
the 1944 amendment to Article IV, Section 6, the legislature has the
power to re-enact Ohio General Code Section 12224 and perhaps in
the not too distant future this statute granting an appeal in those
cases in which the right to a jury trial is denied below, may be dis-
covered and revitalized by the General Assembly so that con-
sistency and stability may be restored in the field of the appellate
jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeals in Ohio.
William J. Lee
Absolute and Qualified Nuisance in Ohio
May a plaintiff, in Ohio, recover damages from a defendant
city for injuries which she received when a car in which she was
riding struck a tree at the edge of a street and in the right of way,
no negligence being shown on the part of the city?, May a plaintiff,
injured when she fell down a flight of stairs on a footbridge while
momentarily blinded by a sudden burst of smoke from defendant's
locomotive below the bridge, recover without alleging and proving
negligence on the part of the defendant railroad?2 Is a defendant
city liable for damages resulting to plaintiff's warehouse when a
water-main, weakened by the city's raising the level of the street
containing it, burst, flooding the warehouse, plaintiff basing its
action on nuisance, without a showing of negligence?3 The Supreme
Court of Ohio, in three recent decisions, answered these questions
in the negative, holding that, in none of these cases did defendant's
act constitute an absolute nuisance, for which there would be lia-
bility without a showing of negligence.
This entire field of nuisance in Ohio has been vague and in-
definite and the Supreme Court, particularly in the Taylor case, has
sought to bring some order to this branch of tort law by setting
up two classes of nuisance: those which are absolute or nuisances
per se for which liability attaches without fault, and those which
1Taylor v. Cincinnati, 143 Ohio St. 426, 55 N.E.2d 724, 155 A.L.R. 44
(1944).
'Metzger v. Pennsylvania, 0. & D. Ry., 146 Ohio St. 406, 66 N.E.2d 203
(1946).
'Interstate Sash and Door Co. v. Cleveland, 148 Ohio St. 325, 74 N.E.2d
239 (1947)'.
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are nuisances arising from negligence, where negligence is the
gravamen of the action and must be pleaded and proved.
Activities which may constitute a nuisance are commonly di-
vided into two classifications: public or common nuisance and
private nuisance. A public nuisance affects an indefinite number of
persons and is generally abated in an action by the people, .acting
through the state or municipality. Types of activity which are
abatable as public nuisances are discussed elsewhere.4 A public
nuisance may become a private nuisance as to a particular indi-
vidual if he be affected by it in a manner distinct from that in
which the public in general is affected. The Restatement of Torts,
Chapter 40, page 217, states that "when an individual suffers special
damage from a public nuisance, he may maintain an action. This,
action for special damages arising out of the maintenance of a
public nuisance is often confused with the action for private
nuisance." Private nuisance is said to be "traditionally restricted
to invasions of interests in the use and enjoyment of land," and, on
page 220 "The feature that gives unity to this field is the interest
invaded, namely, the interest in the use and enjoyment of land."
It should be noted, particularly with reference to the Taylor case,
that the plaintiff relied on Ohio General Code Section 3714, which
states in part that "The council shall have the care, supervision and
control of streets ... and shall cause them to be kept open, in re-
pair and free from nuisance." This section obviously looks to the
protection of interests other than those arising from the ownership
of land.
Some of the confusion involving the tort of nuisance, reflected
in several Ohio opinions has come about by early attempts of
English courts to qualify the original concept of English law, that
anyone who caused harm to another had to make good regardless
of fault. With the advance of civilization, the injustice of this rule
became apparent and fault came to be regarded as the basis of tort
liability. -But there -were-exceptions to this -rule; and absolute lia-
bility continued to be'imposed in certain cases, particularly those
6oncerned with straying of animals and ultra-hazardous activity.
Holmes, in his work, -The Common. Law, at page 154, said, "The
possibility of a great danger has the same effect as the probability
of a less one, and the law throws .the risk of the venture on the
person who introduces the peril into the community."
A further category in which absolute liability without fault
would be imposed was announced in the celebrated English case,
Rylands v. Fletcher,5 where-the doctrine was set down that a person
who, for his own purposes, brings onto his lands and keeps anything
' 30 OHio Jui. 324. -
- L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 37 L.J. Ex. 161, 19.L.T. Rep. 220 (1868).
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not naturally there which is likely to do mischief if it escapes, is
answerable for all damages if it does escape, regardless of fault.
While at the time (1868) many jurisdictions in this country adopted
this doctrine as the common-law rule, others, including Ohio, have
refused to adopt it in toto, as being impracticable in an undeveloped
country where the public policy was directed more for the encour-
agement of industrial enterprise than for the protection of property
interests., But in a number of Ohio cases, the rule of Rylands v.
Fletcher was followed,' although the cases concerned ultra-hazard-
ous activity, involving nitroglycerine, gunpowder, an unexploded
bomb, escaping gas, -and a public carrier. In only the nitroglycerine
case,' was the Rylands case alluded to with favor and even then
the court apparently was careful that it should not adopt the rule
in its broad 'aspects. In one case, City of Barberton v. Miksch 9
where the facts were similar to those in the Rylands case, and the
court could have declared for or against the rule, liability was based
instead upon trespass, "for a seeping of water on the plaintiff's
land," the seeping being held the same as "casting" for the purposes
of the trespass action.
Nuisance, in its ordinary sense, has come to include activity
which results in a recurring or continuing invasion of the plain-
tiff's interests, and therefore is distinguishable from those cases
which fall within the rule of the Rylands case, although at least
one text writer has treated it as an instance of nuisance by broad-
ening the scope of liability therefor.10 A broad construction of the
term nuisance by many American courts has permitted recovery
for numerous things under this head which early English courts
would not have permitted. In this way, some American courts,
purporting to deny the Rylands doctrine, have frequently reached
the same result.
The court, in the Taylor case, supra, page 432, speaking through
Judge Hart, categorized the several types of tortious conduct, list-
Armour & Co. v. Ott, Adm'x., 117 Ohio St. 252, 158 N.E. 189 (1927);
O'Day v. Shouvlin, 104 Ohio St. 519, 136 N.E. 289 (1922); Langabaugh v.
Anderson, 68 Ohio St. 131, 67 N.E. 286 (1903); City of Mansfield v. Balliett,
65 Ohio St. 451, 63 N.E. 86 (1901); Defiance Water Co. v. Olinger, 54 Ohio
St. 532, 44 N.E. 238 (1896); Huff v. Austin, 46 Ohio St. 386, 21 N.E. 864
(1889); Ruffner v. Cincinnati, H. & D. Ry., 34 Ohio St. 96 (1877).
" Bradford Glycerine Co. v. St. Marys Woolen Mfg. Co., 60 Ohio St. 560,
54 N.E. 528, 71 Am. St. Rep. 740, 45 L.R.A. 658 (1899); City of Tiffin v. Mc-
Cormack, 34 Ohio St. 638 (1878); Cleveland v. Ferrando, 114 Ohio St. 207,
150 N.E. 747 (1926); Gas Fuel Co. v. Andrews, 50 Ohio St. 695, 35 N.E.
1059, 29 L.R.A. 337 (1893); The Iron Ry. v. Mowery, 36 Ohio St. 418, 38
Am. Rep. 597 (1881).
'60 Ohio St. 560, 54 N.E. 528, 71 Am. St. Rep. 740, 45 LR.A. 658 (1899).
'128 Ohio St. 169, 190 N.E. 387, 12 Ohio L. Abs. 245 (1934).
2 'SALmoND, TORTS 257 (6th ed. 1924).
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ing, as class 3, "non-culpable acts or conduct resulting in accidental
harm for which, beQause of the hazards involved, the law imposes
strict or absolute liability notwithstanding the absence of fault."
Save for the emphasis on ultra-hazardous activity, this statement,
although it should be classified as dictum, may be said to be an
endorsement of the Rylands doctrine. At least it is in line with the
gunpowder, nitroglycerine, and unexploded bomb cases already re-
ferred to. Class 4, of Judge Hart's category, is more significant,
however. This type of tortious conduct involves "culpable acts of
inadvertence involving unreasonable risks of harm." Into this class
plaintiff's claim, in any of the three main cases, would have fallen,
if he had been able to establish negligence on the part of the de-
fendant. This broad class of conduct, loosely referred to as nuisance,
really depends upon the negligence of the actor and such nuisances
are properly controlled by ordinary doctrines of the law of negli-
gence. Hence contributory negligence is a good defense to an action
for nuisance resulting from negligence and plaintiff must show care
proportioned to the danger. In a leading case on the subject,'
Justice Cardozo pointed out that in the primary, meaning of
nuisance, negligence is not a factor although ,the line between
nuisance and negligence is a narrow one. But nuisance can grow
out of negligence. Thus, an act lawful in itself, may become un-
lawful because of the manner in which it is being done.
The absolute nuisance, or nuisance per se, sometimes arises
from continuing activity which is unlawful in itself. It is also often
used where the occupation is lawful, but because of the locale where
it is done, the actor becomes an insurer for all persons who may
be damaged thereby. Here arises the elusive sic utere tuo dootrine,
which Justice Holmes has said teaches nothing but a benevolent
yearning and which has been qualified as meaning, that a person
must use his own property so as not to injure the rights of another.
Thus the statement is meaningless unless the rights of the other
person are etablished.12 In an Ohio case 3 involving fine dust blown
over plaintiff's land from defendant's stone-cutting business, the
court said, "Major use to which the district is put must establish its
character, as regards existence of private nuisance." Thus, a man
who runs a poultry business which emits noxious fumes, may be
held liable for maintaining an absolute nuisance even though he
may show he came up to the highest possible standard of care in
its operation, because, with respect to the location the business
'McFarlane v. Niagara Falls, 247 N.Y. 340, 160 N.E. 391, 57 A.L.R. 1
(1928).
IREsTATSmENT, ToRTs § 826 (1939). "The utility of the actor's
conduct must be weighed against the gravity of the harm."
" Graham-&-Wagnerr-Inc, v, Ridge, -41- Ohio App. -288, 179 N.E.-693(1931).• "
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should not have been there in the first place. Standard of care is
an element of negligence and has no application in the field of
absolute nuisance. "A nuisance does not rest on the degree of care
used, for that presents a question of negligence, but on the degree
of danger existing even with the best of care."'14
It will be observed that the activity of the defendants, in the
three principal cases was lawful and, not being of an ultra-hazard-
ous type, could not be classed as absolute nuisances. Thus, liability
could be imposed only by showing that the acts became nuisances
through the negligent manner of their performance.
Finally, although the field of nuisance in Ohio must remain in
doubt pending further judicial interpretations, the Taylor case has
been particularly helpful in its discussion of this field. A clear-cut
distinction, however, has been made in all three cases between
absolute nuisance and nuisance arising out of negligence, and the
law at the present may be said to be as follows:
1. Absolute liability will continue to be imposed for
damages resulting from the defendant's ultra-hazardous
activity (nitro-glycerine, gunpowder, etc.).
2. Where defendant's activity is unlawful, per se, he
becomes an absolute insurer as to any harm which results
therefrom.
3. Where defendant's. activity is lawful, and not ultra-
hazardous, and the plaintiff is injured thereby, plaintiff
will be required to show that defendant's activity had be-
come a nuisance because of the negligent manner in which
it was done.
4. Where the nuisance is one which has resulted from
negligence, the plaintiff, although pleading nuisance, will be
required to show care proportioned to the danger, and con-
tributory negligence will be a good defense.
William M. Cromer
20 R.C.L. § 3, p. 381.
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